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ARBITRATION
Imposition of a Cap on Non-economic Damages
Permissible When Plaintiff Refuses to
Arbitrate Damages
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, affinmed a lower
court's decision to grant the defendant physician's motion to limit the
amount of an arbitration award.1 The court held the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action was subject to a non-economic damages cap when the
plaintiff refused physician's offer to enter into arbitration as provided by
state statute.
The plaintiff, as the personal representative of her eight-year-old
daughter, brought a wrongful death action against her daughter's treating
physician, his professional association, and various others.2 In response,
the treating physician offered to enter into binding arbitration under one of
two arbitration provisions in the state mdical malpractice act (Act).3 The
plaintiff refused, relying on a provision of the Act to argue that the
physician's arbitration offer did not include an admission of liability and
was, therefore, defective.4 However, the physician's offer to arbitrate was
made pursuant to a different section of the Act, requiring the imposition of
sanctions upon a party who rejected the offer to submit to binding
arbitration.5 Under the section relied upon by the physician, the rejection
of an arbitration offer placed a $350,000 per incident cap on non-economic
damages. 6
The plaintiff argued the state statute regarding sanctions and a section
requiring an admission of liability should be read in pari materia, thereby
requiring the admission of liablity set forth as a precondition to an offer to
enter into arbitration, However, the court rejected this contention.7 The
court explained that the physician expressly made his offer to arbitrate
under a section of the Act which did not require the admission of liability.
'Platman v. Holmes Reg'l Medical Ctr., 6S3 So. 2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
2 Id.
3 d. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207).
Id (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106). Section 766.106 required an admission of liability
when submitting to arbitration on the issue of damages.
5id. at 673 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.207 and 766.209).
6Platman v. Holmes Reg'1 Medical Ctr., 683 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.207 and 766.209). The Act, however, did not place a cap an
potential damages upon rejection of an offer.
7Id.
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Moreover, the court found the two section were separate and distinct
provisions of Act, and the plaintiff could not create a hybrid arbitration
procedure by combining elements of both sections.8 Therefore, plaintiff's
rejection of defendant's offer to arbitrate required the imposition of a
$350,000 cap on non-economic damages.9 Platman v. Holmes Regional
Med. Ctr., 683 So.2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
DISABILITY
Pseudonym Allowed in Civil Action for Benefits
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held parties were permitted to use a pseudonym when bringing civil actions
if the privacy interests of the party outweighed the public's right of access
to the identity of the litigant."0 The court entered a protective order
allowing the plaintiff to proceed in an action under a pseudonym pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which allow the court to enter a
protective under upon a showing of "good cause" in order to protect a
party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense."
The plaintiff sought to obtain total disability benefits under a disability
insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance company.12 Subsequent
to purchasing the policy, the plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from a
number of psychiatric disorders. 3 The patient underwent treatment for
these illnesses and was unable to continue working. 4 The patient's
employer subsequently paid him monthly benefits for a year and a half
before terminating those benefits.' The plaintiff filed his complaint under
"Id. at 674.
'Id.
"Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-5557, 1997 WL 9796, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 8, 1997).
"Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. PRO. 26(c)).
12 Id.
13Id.
14Id.
'Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-5557, 1997 WL 9796, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 8, 1997).
[Vol. 1:655656
CASE BRIEFS
the pseudonym "James Doe," seedng reinstatement of benefits. 6 The
employer moved to strike the complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which required the complaint to name all parties. 7
The court cited several reasons for granting the plaintiff's motion to
proceed under a pseudonym, including a desire to avoid deterring people
with mental illness from litigation. The court also stated the plaintiff had
used steps from the beginning of the case to assure confidentiality because
he feared stigmatization in the community based on his mental disorder *
The court reasoned that the use of a pseudonym would not interfere with
the public's right of access to civil proceedings, and that if the individual
avoided litigation, the government may be forced to support him instead.' 9
Because the employer had not been hampered in the discovery process, the
court found the plaintiff possessed no ulterior motive in maintaining
anonymity.20 Thus, the court entered a protective order allowing the use
of a pseudonym after finding "good cause" to do so. 21 Doe v. Provident
Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-5557, 1997 WL 9790 (ED. Pa. Jan. 8,
1997).
Cancer Diagnosis Does Not Establish Disability
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an
employee who underwent chemotherapy and was subsequently fired from
his job did not qualify as a disabled person; thus, the employee could not
obtain relief under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).' The ADA
prohibits an employer from discriminating against a potential employee
because of a disability.2Y In order to prove the existence of a disability
within the meaning of the Act, an employee must prove that he or she has
161d.
17 d. (citing FED. R. Civ. PRo. 10(a)).
"I1d. at *3.
L'Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-5557, 1997 W 9796, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 8, 1997).
0Id.
21 d. at *5.
22Cordon v. E.L Harem & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907 (1 th Cir. 1996).21d. at 910 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
1997]
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a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity
or that people perceive him or her as having such an impairment.2 4
The employee in this case was hired by an employer who had
contracted to do maintenance work for a military housing project.' When
the employee was diagnosed with malignant lymphoma, he took an
extended leave of absence from work to undergo certain tests. The
employee's physician prescribed a course of treatment that included blood
tests once a week and chemotherapy once every three weeks. The
physician also said that this treatment would not interfere with the
employee's normal activities, which included work. However, the
employee's immediate supervisor did not allow the employee to return to
work until he was instructed to do so by the vice president of the housing
project. When the employee finally did resume working, his job
description had changed significantly.26 Shortly after his return to work,
the employee and his supervisor had an argument which resulted in the
employee's dismissal. The employee filed suit against the defendant and
the jury found in his favor. The court denied the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law and this appeal followed.
From the facts of this case, the court found the employee was
physically impaired because of the chemotherapy treatments he underwent,
but this impairment did not limit any major life activities such as walking,
breathing, speaking, learning, or working.27 In order to show a disability
"substantially limits" the activity of working, an employee must be
significantly restricted in his ability to perform a job compared to an
average person with comparable skills.' The court found a jury could not
conclude that the employee in this case was limited in any of the specified
major life activities, including his ability to work. 9 Specifically, the court
noted the employee handled the side effects of chemotherapy well, and said
himself that he was fully capable of working.3"
24Id.
2d. at 909.
21d.
'Gordon v. E.L. Hanun & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907,909(llth Cir. 1996).
2Id. at 912 (citing C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
29d.
30d.
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The court also concluded the employee was not regarded by his
employer or co-employees as having an impairment." To establish this
contention, the employee had to show he had an impairment which
imposed no physical limitations but was treated as such, or that he was
limited in his physical capabilities only because of the attitudes of others
regarding the impairment.32 The court concluded that a finding could not
be made that the employer viewed the employee as having an impairment. 3
The fact the employee did not have the exact same assignments as before
his chemotherapy treatments was, in actuality, based on the nature of the
project he was worldng on. The project required the employee to perform
different activities than those he had worked on before his leave of absence
because his old assignments had either been completed or taken over by
other employees. Because the court found insufficient evidence to support
a finding that the employee was either limited in his life activities, or that
he was perceived as having a limiting impairment, the court held that the
employee did not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA.'
Gordon v. EJL. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996).
DISCRIMINATION
Proof of Denial or Inadequate Treatment Required
to Sustain Discrimination Charge Against Provider
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgment in favor of a hospital and various nurses in a
discrimination suit brought against them by an HIV-positive patient under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),3" the Consolidated Omnibus
311d
'Gordon v. E.L Harem & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907,912-913(llth Cir. 1996).
3Id.
34Id. at 914.
35Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. CIV.A. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524 (FD. Pa. Dac. 23,
1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
6591997]
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Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA),36 and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.37
The patient sought treatment at the defendant hospital for two broken
wrists sustained in an assault.3" When the patient was first admitted to the
hospital, he disclosed his BIV-positive status to a hospital employee."
Subsequently, the patient claimed he received inadequate and
discriminatory treatment due to his HIV-positive status, and that hospital
staff members impermissibly disclosed his HIV infection to numerous
people, causing him to lose his job as a hairstylist and siffer extreme
emotional and physical distress.' The patient brought an action against the
hospital alleging that the discriminatory treatment he received as a patient
violated the ADA, COBRA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4
The patient first alleged the hospital discriminated against him in
violation of the ADA by denying hrim, inter alia, the opportunity to
participate in the services and facilities of the hospital.42 Although the
patient was able to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA43, the court found the patient
demonstrated no instance in which he was denied treatment on the basis of
his HIV-positive status.' Because the patient offered no evidence that the
hospital denied him care or gave him unequal care as a result of his HIV-
positive status, the court concluded the patient failed to meet his burden
of proving the hospital discriminated against him on the basis of his
3MId. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd).
37Md. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 701.
-Id. at *1.39Id.
"Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
23, 1996).
41Id. The patient also asserted state law claims against the hospital for disclosure of his
HIV-positive status, including claims for breach of the Pennsylvania Confidentiality of M1V-
Related Information Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7601 (1993), breach of physician-patient
confidentiality, invasion of privacy through the public disclosure of private facts, negligent
supervisicn and training, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, corporate liability,
and punitive damages. The court, however, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
these claims and dismissed them without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).42 d. at *4.
431d.
'4d. at *7.
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disability.45 Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
hospital and its employees on each of the patient's claims under the ADA.46
The patient next alleged the hospital violated the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) provision of COBRA by
failing to employ appropriate screening mechanisms and by failing to
stabilize his emergency conditions4 To establish a violation of EMTALA,
a claimant must demonstrate the following:
(1) the patient had an emergency medical condition;
(2) the hospital actually knew of this condition;
(3) the patient was not stabilized before being transferred; and
(4) prior to the transfer of an unstable patient, the transferring hospital
did not obtain the proper consent or follow the appropriate
certification and transfer procedures.'
In determining whether the patient alleged a sufficient cause of action
under EMTALA, the court noted that recovery under EMTALA is limited
to those circumstances in which a hospital fails to provide a patient
suffering an emergency medical condition 9 with appropriate screening and
stabilization prior to transfer or discharge." Because the patient failed to
produce any evidence that he suffered from an emergency medical
condition or that he received inadequate or inappropriate screening of his
condition, the court concluded the patient filled to state a claim against the
hospital under EMTALA.5' Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the hospital.'
'Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-3168, 1996 WL745524, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dee.
23, 1996).46ld.
41d.
Idat t*8 (citing Holcomb v. Humana Medical Corp., 831 F. Supp. 829 (M.D. Ala. 1993),
affd sub nom., Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Baber v. Ho'pital
Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992)).
9Id. (citing Toltot v. American Biodyne, 854 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ohio 1993), aff'd, 48 F.3d
937 (6th Cir. 1995)). An emergency medical condition exists only if a patient is in imminent
danger of death or serious injury.
-Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-316S, 1996 WL 745524, at *8 (RD. Pa. Dee.
23, 1996) (citing Griffith v. Mount Carmel Medical Ctr., 831 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Kan. 1993)).51ld.
52Id.
19971
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Finally, the patient claimed the alleged substandard treatment he
received and the alleged disclosure of his HIV-positive status by the
hospital constituted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.5' In
evaluating the validity of the patient's claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
the court noted the well-established principal that, "whether a suit is filed
under the Rehabilitation Act or under the ADA, the substantive standards
for determining liability are the same."' The court found that, due to the
similar nature of statutes, Congress made it clear that identical standards
should be applied to claims raised under either act.55 Therefore, in
compliance with the clear congressional intent of the ADA, the court
concluded summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim under the
Rehabilitation Act must also be granted in favor of the hospital.56 Doe v.
Montgomery Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-3168,1996 WL 745524 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
23, 1996).
Patient Claim of Disability Discrimination Based Upon
Personal Relationship with Therapist That
Interfered with Therapy
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
dismissal of a claim alleging a violation of the Rehabilitation Act due to
discrimination in a patient's treatment for a mental disorder'5 The court
reached its decision after reviewing the legislative history of the
Rehabilitation Act, the statute itself, and case law relating to the Act.5"
The patient was admitted to the hospital as a psychiatric patient59 for
a condition which was considered a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Id.
'Id. at *9 (citing Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278,281 (4th Cir. 1995)).
'Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
23, 1996).
5MId.
'Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Northwestern Ind., 104 F.3d 116 (7th Cir. 1997).
58d. at 123.
591d. at 118. Ms. Grzan was admitted for "major depressive episode," "borderline
personality disorder," and "post-traumatic stress disorder," all of which constituto a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act.
(Vol. 1:655662
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Act.6" The patient was treated by a therapist employed by the hospital.6'
During her hospitalization, the patient became intimately involved with the
therapist, and continued this intimate relationship even after discharge from
the hospital.62 Two years after the relationship ended, the patient filed a
suit against the hospital and the therapist alleging disability discrimination
that prohibited her from receiving adequate treatment for her handicap.63
The patient's claim was dismissed based on the Congressional intent that
the statute apply only to people denied employment opportunities and
program accessibility based on disability discrimination.'
The issue presented to this court was whether the patient's claim fell
under the Rehabilitation Act.65 The court reviewed the statute as applied,
the legislative history, and the case law to determine whether the patient
had a claim.' 6 First, the Rehabilitation Act covers only those programs or
entities that receive federal funds and although the hospital received federal
funds, the therapist, as an employee of the hospital, did not.67 However,
the patient's "denial" of proper treatment was due to the therapist's
actions, and not discrimination by the hospital."' Further, the patient's
claim was based on a comparison between her treatment and the treatment
of other handicapped patients, yet the Rehabilitation Act was meant to
apply only when handicapped and non-handicapped people were treated
differently.69
Finally, the therapist's relationship with the patient was not part of the
hospital's treatment plan, and further, if the Rehabilitation Act had been
6'Id.
'Grzanv. Charter Hosp. of Northwestern Ind., 104 F.3d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1997).631d.
6Id.
Id.
'Id. Ms. Grzan had to prove four elements to survive the motion to dismiss: (1) she was
handicapped under the definition in the act; (2) she was qualified for the benefit she sought; (3)
she was discriminated against only because of her handicap; and (4) the program in question
received federal funds.
67Id.
6Id. at 122.
69Id. The legislative history of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 39 U.S.C. § 794,
indicated to the court Congress intended the act to provide equal employment and proram
accessibility to people with disabilities, not to complaints regarding a handicapped person's
"receipt of benefits."
1997] 663
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applicable, it would only cover the treatment plan of an institution, and not
the individual behavior of a particular employee.70 Thus, the court
concluded the patient's claim was improper under the Rehabilitation Act,
and should have been brought under a tort theory instead."1 Grzan v.
Charter Hosp. of Northwestern Ind.,104 F.3d 116 (7th Cir. 1997).
Employment Contracts
Discharge of Medical Student for Educational Reasons
Does Not Breach Hospital-Residency Agreement
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a hospital did not breach a
residency agreement when it discharged a resident because he failed to
meet educational standards. The Court reasoned the context in which the
resident was discharged was based not on an employment relationship, but
on an educational decision.'
A resident physician was dismissed during the final year of his surgical
residency training program.7" The resident and the hospital had entered
into a residency agreement which was subject to yearly renewal, dependent
upon a favorable evaluation by faculty members at the hospital.74 In his
fourth year, the hospital determined that the resident did "not show any
potential for being a safe and independent" surgeon and dismissed him."
The resident sought damages from the hospital for an alleged breach of an
employment contract.76 The trial court granted the hospital's motion for
summary and the state supreme court affirmed on appeal.
First, the court held that the resident failed to identify any disputed
issues of material fact which would characterize his relationship with the
hospital as coming under an "employment contract." '7 The court assessed
701d. at 123.
71Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Northwestern Ind., 104 F.3d 116, 123 (7th Cir. 1997).
72Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A2d 111 (Con. 1996).
7id. at 113-114.
74Id.
7SId. at 114.761d.
'Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 115 (Conn. 1996).
[Vol. 1:655664
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the nature of the resident's employment status through the language of the
residency agreement.' The court concluded that despite the hybrid nature
of the residency agreement which contained both employment and
educational features.7 9 the fact that the resident was dismissed due to poor
clinical performance implicated the educational component of the residency
agreement and was, therefore, an academic decision.0'O
Next, the resident alleged that even if his dismissal was properly
grounded on academic reasons, the hospital (1) failed to provide him with
appropriate training, and (2) discharged him arbitrarily, capriciously, or in
bad faith." With regard to the former claim, the court followed the
common law rule that "educational malpractice" claims were not
cognizable; because they put the judiciary in the awkward position of
defining what was a reasonable educational program and of deciding
whether that standard has been breached.2 With regard to the second
claim, the court's approach was one of academic deference, particularly in
the area of medical education." The resident did not satisfy the heavy
burden of showing the hospital's decision had "no discernible rational
basis," the test required to implicate substantive due process in this type of
case.' Because the hospital's decision to dismiss the resident was both
educational and rational, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of
the hospital. Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A2d 111 (Conn.
1996).
7
,Id.
Id. at 116. On the one hand, the agreement provided that the "objective" of the pro2ram
was to provide a "proper educational experience" and the "program covcrcd by this agreement
is part of an overall program of education." Conversely, the agrcement contained pro,.iiz
indicative of an employment contract such as salary insurance coverage, and vacation time.
81d. at 117.
81 d.
"Guptav. New Britain Gen. Hasp., 6-7 A.2d 111, 119 (Cnn. 1996) (citing Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d. 814 (1976)).
"Id. at 119.
'Id.
6651997]
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EVIDENCE
DNA Population Frequency Statistics Admissible
Only After Satisfying Frye Test
The Supreme Court of Horida held that DNA evidence was not admissible
unless both distinct steps of the DNA testing process satisfied the
requirements delineated for new or novel scientific evidence announced in
Frye v. United States.85 The Frye test requires a judicial determination,
based upon a preponderance of the proponent's evidence, that the
underlying principles have been sufficiently tested and accepted among the
relevant scientific community.86
The court began its analysis by clarifying the two distinct steps in the
DNA testing process. The first step results in an indication that two DNA
samples look the same and according to the court, this step will always
satisfy the Frye test if conducted properly." The second step involves a
quantitative, scientifically valid estimate showing how closely the two
patterns match. s The court explained the second step is necessary to give
significance to the first step, and assists a court or jury to understand the
importance of a match. 9 The court stated the second step in the DNA
testing process was based on principles of statistics and population
genetics, and therefore, the Frye test was an appropriate validation
method.9° The court also refuted arguments that the calculation of
population frequency statistics was not new or novel.
After determining that both steps in the DNA testing process required
satisfaction of Frye, the court addressed the issue of whether two or more
different frequency calculations could simultaneously satisfy Frye. The
court explained that while two conflicting calculations could not both
typically satisfy Frye, an alternative modification of the DNA testing
"Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997) (citing Frye v. United State,, 293 F.2d 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923)).
'Id. at 272 (citing Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995)).
17d. at 269.
81d. at 270.
Id.
'Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 1997).
[Vol. 1:655666
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procedure would be admissible if it satisfied Frye.9' As an example, the
court explained the differences between a "ceiling principle" and a
"modified ceiling principle," both of which are methods of determining
how closely two DNA patterns match? The modified version was created
after the original version was found to give extremely conservative results.
Although the original version is no longer used, it is still considered a
reliable method; thus, both the original and modified principles are capable
of simultaneously satisfying Frye.
The court remanded this case for further evidentiary determinations
because of significant changes in the science of DNA testing since the
beginning of the trial. 3 The court found it was unable to make a decision
in this case without knowledge of the state's exact methods of calculating
population frequency statistics at the time of the trial.94 Brim v. State, 645
So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997).
Evidence Excluded in Products Liability Action
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that evidence
which merely suggested a link between Ethylene Oxide exposure and
increased risk of brain cancer, and was only clearly linked to causation of
brain tumors in animal studies, did not rise to the level of evidentiary
sufficiency under the federal rules of evidence to allow the admission of
such evidence in a products liability action.9"
An employee who worked at a hospital for over twenty years died of
brain cancer.' 6 His family brought a products liability action against the
manufacturers of Ethylene Oxide (EtO) cylinders, alleging the employee
had been exposed to EtO while employed at the hospital, and that such
9 Id. at 271.
2Id.
9'Id. at 274.
9Id.
'Allenv. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702,
FED. R. EviD. 703).
%Id
6671997]
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exposure was the cause of his death.' The trial court granted the
manufacturer's motion for judgment as a matter of law on tha grounds that
the opinions of all three of the plaintiff's experts were inadmissible in
federal court for lack of scientific grounding. The appellate court affirmed.
The court excluded evidence produced by the plaintiff's expert witnesses
including:
(1) human epidemiological studies that merely "suggested" an association
between EtO exposure and brain cancer;
(2) studies that showed EtO was capable of causing tumors in certain
rats; and
(3) the fact the EtO was a known carcinogen.93 The court held that
"suggestive" evidence9 and "inconclusive" animal studies' were not
sufficient to scientifically support a causal connection between EtO
exposure and human brain cancer.''
Next, the court determined the "weight of the evidence" standard" 2
used by regulatory and advisory bodies, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), was not scientifically acceptable in
demonstrating a medical link between EtO exposure and brain cancer. 103
The court stated the "weight of the evidence" standard was lower't than
the standard appropriate in tort law which required a more particularized
showing of cause and effect and required a plaintiff to prove "that it is
more likely than not that another individual has caused him or her harm"1°5
Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996).
'Id.
91M. at 196.
99Id. at 197.
"
00Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
1011d. at 197.
'd, at 198. This "weight of the evidence" standard is one used by regulatory and advisory
bodies such as the EPA to assess the carcinogenicity of various substances in human beings and
to suggest or make rules governing human exposure.
103Id.
"1°Id. The agencies' lower burden of proof is based on the preventative perspective that the
agencies adopt in order to reduce public exposure to harmful substances.
" Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Wright v.
Willamette Industries, 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996)).
[Vol. 1:655668
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EXPERT WITNESS
Witness' Testimony Inadmissible When Theory on Use of
Bone Marrow Transplants Not Widely Accepted
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld a trial court's grant of a
judgment not withstanding the verdict (JNOV) in a medical malpractice
suit, because the trustees of the deceased patient based their entire proof
of causation on a medical expert's testimony which was later determined
inadmissible."° The court reached its decision after analyzing the witness'
testimony under both the Daubert and Frye standard, and found the
testimony did not satisfy either test.107
At age nine, the decedent was diagnosed with attention deficit
disorder by the physicians in this case.1 13 Two years later, a specialist
discovered that the decedent suffered from a degenerative brain disease
called metachromatic leukodystrophy (MLD) which, without treatnnt,
would eventually result in death."° A specialist recommended a bone
marrow transplant (BMT)11° and the trustees consented to a transplant
with an unrelated donor.1 ' Six months after the BMT, the decedent died
from a fungal infection which was systemic, but largely attacked his
brain." The trustees brought a malpractice claim against the physicians
who had first diagnosed the decedent with attention deficit disorder,
claiming their misdiagnosis delayed treatment of the decedent and led to
his death."3
The issue presented to the court was whether a ndical expert's
testimony to prove causal link between the original physician's
misdiagnosis and the decedent's death was impermissible, making the grant
of the JNOV proper." 4 The trial court reserved its ruling on a motion in
1
°6Weselyv. Alexander, No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL7220S4 (Minn. Dc. 19, 1996).
lccId. at *3-4. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and Daubert v.
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical, 509 U.S. 579 (1996).
Id. at *4-6.
1
"Id. at*1.
"
1Id. at *2.
... Weselyv. Alexander, No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL7220S4, at *2 (Minm Dec. 19,1996).
22Id.
114Md.
6691997]
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limine to exclude the testimony of the expert for the trustees.115 Instead,
the admissibility of the testimony was reviewed during the trial at the same
time the jury heard the testimony. 6 After the jury returned a verdict for
the trustees, the court granted the motion for JNOV, stating the expert's
testimony did not pass the Frye test for admissibility and was the only
evidence the trustees had to prove causation. 7 The Frye standard,
typically used by courts in the state, requires the witness to be an expert
and his principle of BMT with MLD to be a well-recognized scientific
principle.' In this case, the expert's testimony did not pass the Frye test
because BMT treatment was not a generally accepted treatment for MLD
in the medical field. Moreover, the specifics of the procedure performed
here were rare, therefore, it could not be proven that the decedent would
have lived if the treatment had been given two years earlier, at the time of
the misdiagnosis. n9
The court also analyzed the case under Daubert and found the
procedure satisfied the requirement that the procedure be a medically
tested and published treatment 2 However, because the treatment was so
rare and the potential rate of error was uncertain, the procedure had not
yet been "generally accepted by the scientific community."' 21 Therefore,
the court concluded the expert's testimony stating that BMT would have
saved the decedent's life if it had been performed earlier did not pass either
the Frye or Daubert tests. Because the trustees' entire showing of
causation rested upon this expert's testimony, the grant of JNOV was
115 d.
.
6Wesely v. Alexander, No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL 722084, at *2 (Mim. Dec. 19, 1996).
The courts reason for permitting the trial to proceed before determining the admissibility of the
evidence was to promote judicial economy, a faster trial. Id.
'
71d.; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Fry.? court stated the
principle that the expert witness' testimony is based on must be "sufficiently etablished to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
"Wesely, 1996 WL 722084 at *5.
"'Id. The plaintiffs expert witness was considered an expert witness in his field, just his
procedure was in question. Id.
"
2
'Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The
Daubert court stated that the testimony the expert witness is giving must "assist the trier of fact
to understand a fact in issue." For this to be accomplished, a preliminary assessment to guarantee
the testimony is scientifically valid and the methodology can be applied to the specific facts of
the case must be done.
"
mWesely v. Alexander, No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL 722084, at *6 (Minn. Dec. 19, 1996).
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proper. Wesely v. Alexander, No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL 722084 (Minn.
Dec. 19, 1996).
Expert Witnesses Against Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer and Prescribing Physician Must Meet
Daubert Standard for Scientific Testimony
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
a lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a drug
manufacturer, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with the court's determination that the testimony of the plaintiffs expert
witnesses satisfied the Daubert standard.1'
The plaintiff and her parents filed suit against the manufacturer of the
drug Depo-Provera and the physician who prescribed it, alleging the drug
caused birth defects with which plaintiff was born."z The manufacturer
moved for summary judgment, claiming the plaintiff failed to provide
scientific evidence linking the drug to the birth defects."2 In response, the
plaintiff submitted the affidavits of two physicians -- an epidemiologist and
a teratologist." Because both physicians failed to identify publications,
studies, or methodologies upon which they based their testimony, the
district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer noting the
experts' opinions were "conclusory and unsupported."'26 Plaintiff
appealed, and the district court reversed and remanded for further inquiry
into whether the expert testimony was admissible." On remand, the
district court ruled the expert testimony was inadmissible and insufficient
to create an issue of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment for the
manufacturer was appropriate. Plaintiff appealed again.
mAmbrosiniv. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Daubcrtv. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993)).
mId. at 131.
1i'1d. at 132.
mId.
'Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Relying on Daubert, the appellate court explained that the district
court performed a "gate keeping" role in assessing the admissibility of
scientific testimony." s  When determining the admissibility of such
evidence, the court must satisfy a two-prong test. First, the testimony
must be based upon scientific knowledge which requires the testimony be
derived through the use of the "scientific method."' 29  Second, the
testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand a fact at issue. 3 '
The plaintiff's first expert, an epidemiologist, asserted a general causal
link between Depo-Provera and the brain defect from which plaintiff
suffered. The epidemiologist testified his conclusion was premised upon
standard epidemiological methods. After setting forth the method
employed, the court held the testimony of the epidemiologit satisfied the
first prong of the Daubert standard."' Further, because the testimony
could assist the jury in deciding the case, the court found the
epidemiologist's testimony satisfied the second prong and was, therefore,
admissible. 32
Next, the court addressed the testimony of the second expert, the
teratologist, and found that this expert's findings were based upon an
accepted methodology which was confirmed by journal publications.'33
Furthermore, the court found the testimony was not controverted by any
epidemiological evidence, and therefore, satisfied the Daubert standard.13
Because the testimony of both physicians satisfied the Daubert standard,
the court held the testimony was admissible and summary judgment was
reversed. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
"Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993)).
1291d. at 133.
13Od.
'
37d. at 136.
'Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
'131d. at 137.
mId.
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INFORMED CONSENT
Surgical Incision and Scarring Necessary Part
of Vasectomy Procedure, Not Material Risk
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, affinred the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant physician in a medical
malpractice action. 35 The court held that an informed consent issue did
not exist where the patient had consented to the vasectomy procedure.'
The patient was examined by the defendant physician in order to obtain
a "no scalper' vasectomy." Since this type of vasectomy procedure
entailed a smaller incision than a conventional vasectomy, minimal bleeding
occurred and no stitches were necessary.' Prior to surgery, the patient
was informed of possible risks and complications of the procedure and
subsequently, the patient and his wife signed a consent form.' The
physician successfully performed the "no scalpel" vasectomy on the
patient's left side, however, difficulties arose while trying to perform the
procedure on the patient's right side, and the physician was unable to
complete the procedure.' The physician explained to the patient the
difficulties which had arisen and the various treatment options at that
point 14' The patient disliked the idea of having the procedure completed
at a later time and authorized the physician to make an incision in order to
complete the vasectomy.142
After the operation, the patient was dissatisfied with the length of the
incision, which required several stitches and resulted in a sear.' Instead
of returning to the defendant physician for post-operative care, the patient
was examined by two other urologists.' 4 The first physician assured the
I3SHayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
'3'Id. at 696.
wId. at 692.
'Id.
"Hayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
1411d.1 Id.
1l'Id.
4Id. at 693.
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patient the tenderness was normal following the procedure. 145 About a
month later, the second physician prescribed an antibiotic and painkillers
since the patient still complained of tenderness. 146 Despite a medical
review panel's determination that the defendant physician did not breach
the appropriate standard of care, the patient filed suit against the physician
and his insurance carrier.147 The trial court granted the defendant
physician's motion for summary judgment to which plaintiff appealed. 48
First, the court assessed the applicable standard for summary judgment. 149
The court adopted the more liberal federal standard for summary judgment,
maintaining that a recent amendment to the state code of civil procedure
supported such an interpretation.'50 Second, the court determined the
applicable state law regarding informed consent.' The court explained
that a patient must be informed of the material risks of a procedure. 2
Thus, if a reasonable person would have foregone the procedure if he or
she had known of the undisclosed risk, the physician's failure to inform
would be the cause of the patient's injury. 3 The court concluded that the
patient's injury, namely the larger incision and subsequent scar, was a
necessary part of the procedure rather than a material risk."M Further, the
court found that the patient had consented to the larger incision in order
to ensure sterilization, thereby supporting the trial court's granting of
summary judgment since no material issue of fact existed.' 5 Hayes v.
Autin, 685 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
" Hayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1996).141d.
14Id.
14'Id. at 693-94.
149Id
5'IHayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691, 694-95 (citing LA. CODE Civ. P. Art. 966, No. 89, § 1
(1984) (amended by Act of May 1, 1996, No. 9, § 1)).
11d. at 695.
152Id.
Lid.
'-Id. at 695.
'
55Hayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
[Vol. 1:655674
CASE BRIEFS
Insurance
Fiduciary of Health Care Plan Lacked Standing to
Bring Suit Under ERISA to Recover
Benefits for Employee
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court by granting summary judgment to an
employer in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) action. 5 The court held that the employer, as the fiduciary of
a health care plan, could not recover benefits for employees under ERISA
because the employer lacked standing to bring suit.'O
In an attempt to reduce its premiums, the employer canceled a group
insurance plan, replacing it with a reinsurance policy and a self-insured
plan.15 8 An employee who was not working at the time the old plan was
replaced, and did not return to work prior to his readmittance to the
hospital for a heart condition, died." 9 Prior to death, the employee
incurred substantial medical expenses amounting to $160,000 that were
paid by his employer."° Since the employee did not work on the effective
date of the new plan and did not return to work before his death, the
employee was not covered by the new reinsurance policy or self-funded
plan.M61 The employer attempted to obtain reimbursement from the former
insurance company and subsequently filed suit when the former insurance
company declined payment.162 The employer alleged the insurance
company breached its fiduciary duties by refusing to pay the employee's
medical expenses.6 3 Specifically, the employer sought $160,000 in
damages and requested specific performance of the former plan."c
...Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 102 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1996).
Ild. at 713.
mId.
1wId.
"Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 102 F.3d 712,713 (4th Cir. 1996).
1 Id.
16d.
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Although the employer was denied monetary recovery, the lower court
held the employee was indeed covered under the former insurance plan."6 5
Accordingly, the court ordered the former insurance company to pay the
employee's medical expenses incurred between the date the new plan
became effective and the employee's death." The insurance company
appealed, arguing that a fiduciary, such as the employer, was not entitled
to recover benefits for a participant under ERISA."67
On appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the district court,
holding the employer lacked standing to recover benefits for the employee
under ERISA.'" First, the court found that fiduciaries did not have a
cause of action under ERISA since the relevant provision stated that only
"participants" or "beneficiaries" may sue for benefits.169 Second, the court
relied on Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell for the proposition
that ERISA permitted recovery only for the plan as a whole, rather than for
individual beneficiaries. 70 Third, the court stated that the language of
ERISA suggested that Congress intended ERISA to apply to more general
violations of the plan as opposed to relief for individual beneficiaries. 17
The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to provide fiduciaries with
a cause of action for benefits under ERISA, particularly since Congress
addressed fiduciary actions under separate provisions of the Act, and did
not include fiduciaries in the provisions relating to causes of actions for
benefits.172
The court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's statement
in Varity Corp. v. Howe that ERISA could be construed to provide relief
for breach of a fiduciary duty in cases where adequate relief was not
provided. 73 However, the court distinguished Varity on the basis the
plaintiffs in Varity were former plan participants, not fiduciaries as was the
case in this action."7" The court concluded the remedy under ERISA for
1651d.
"CGoyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 102 F.3d 712, 713-14 (4th Cir. 1996).
'
67Id. at 714.
1
"Id. at 717. The employer's suit was brought under § 502(a)(1) of ERISA.
1 d. at 714.
1701d. at 714-15 (citing Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)).
'
71Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 102 F.3d 712,715 (4th Cir. 1996).1721d.
'DId. at 716 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (1996)).
'
741d. at 716.
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payment of benefits was adequate without permitting fiduciaries to sue, as
was evidenced by the absence of other fiduciaries filing suit for benefits. 5
The court further reasoned that denying fiduciaries recovery was consistent
with the ERISA exhaustion requirement mandating claimants use internal
claim procedures since fiduciaries do not have the requisite medical
information to file such claims. 76 Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, Inc., 102 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1996).
Hospital Lacks Standing to File Suit for Payment
of Medical Expenses Against Insurance
Company as Fiduciary for ERISA Plan
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employer in a suit brought by a hospital under the Employee
Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA). 77 The court held the
hospital lacked standing to file a suit against the employer because the
insurance company that provided the ERISA plan was not a fiduciary, and
therefore, lacked the authority necessary to alter the plan.1 3
The employer maintained a self-insured ERISA welfare plan for its
employees.'79 Pursuant to a contract, an insurance company provided
administrative services for the employer, although the insurance company
did not have the authority to alter the ERISA plan.' An employee of the
defendant enrolled himself as a participant in the ERISA plan, choosing not
to enroll any dependent children as beneficiaries.' When the employee's
son was taken to the plaintiff hospital for rehabilitation therapy, the child's
"7Id.
' o) e & DelanyCo. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 102 P.3d 712,716-17 (4th Cir. 1996).
rHealthsouth Rehabilitation Hosp. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir.
1996).171d. at 1009.
'-R1d. at 1006.
0Id. at 1006-07.
1
"Id. at 1007.
19971
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mother stated the child was covered under his father's insurance plan.52
Before providing any treatment, the hospital's admissions coordinator
telephoned the insurance company to verify the child's coverage under the
ERISA plan. 83  The insurance company's representative incorrectly
informed the hospital coordinator that the child was covered."8 Over a
month later, an employee of the hospital was notified that the child was not
a beneficiary of his father's plan.' 85 Shortly thereafter, the child was
discharged from the hospital having incurred medical expenses totaling
$82,967." 6 Because the employer refused to pay the child's medical bills,
the hospital filed suit." The district court granted summary judgment for
the employer, and the hospital appealed."8
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
hospital lacked standing to file suit under ERISA.'89 The insurance
company was found not to be a fiduciary under the ERISA plan, the court
reasoned, since the insurance company's duties were limited to processing
claims and determining which individuals were covered by looking at a
computer screen."g Since the insurance company was not a fiduciary, the
insurance company lacked the authority to extend the ERISA plan's
coverage to a non-beneficiary.' The court further stated that even if the
insurance company was a fiduciary, the oral representations made by the
employer that a child was covered would not be sufficient to extend
coverage since modifications to the plan must be in writing and must
comply with formal amendment procedures."9
Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's discovery ruling
rejecting the hospital's argument that it did not have sufficient time to
" Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hosp. v. AmericanNat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1007 (4th
Cir. 1996).
841d.
1MId.
"SId.
'"HealthsIouth Rehabilitaticm Hosp. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1007 (4th
Cir. 1996).
1 Id. at 1008.
189Id.
11°Id. at 1009.
191Id.
1
"Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hosp. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1009 (4th
Cir. 1996).
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complete discovery.' 93 The court explained that additional time for
discovery would not change the fact that the child was not entitled to
coverage under the plan.194 Finally, the court upheld the district court's
refusal to allow the hospital to amend its complaint to include an estoppel
cause of action. 95 The court found that written plans have never been
changed based on estoppel arguments.'16 Healthsouth Rehabjlitation
Hosp. v. American Nat' Red Cross, 101 F3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1996).
IMMIUNITY
Qualified Immunity Granted to Public Health Department
Publishing Manual Identifying Certain HIV-Infected
Participants in State Program
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a
district court order granting the state department of education's
(Department) motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity after the department published and distributed an AIDS
prevention manual identifying the plaintiffs as HIV- positive.197
The plaintiffs were HIV-positive individuals who participated in
educational seminars for social workers and educators focusing on HIV
prevention.19 The defendants were employed by the Department's
HI V/AIDS program where they developed and implemented seminars for
people teaching HIV prevention.' 9  The Department published and
distributed a manual entitled "Setting up HIV Prevention Education
Programs Including People Living with HIV/AIDS."' - Included in the
manual were the full names of the plaintiffs and mention of their HIV-
19Id. at 1009-10.
'94Id
"
195Id. at 1010.
196Id.
"Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 1997).
19Id. at 108.
wId.2OOId
"
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positive status.2 ' Outraged by the public exposure received from the
manual, the plaintiffs brought a civil rights claim, alleging the department
violated their right to privacy under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.2"
At the time the manual was released, the law was unclear regarding
what constituted a waiver of one's right to privacy. 3 Therefore, the main
issue before the court was whether it was objectively reasonable for the
department to have included the plaintiffs' name in the manual.2" In
reaching its decision, the court analyzed the doctrine of governmental
qualified immunity, noting that "[g]overnment actors performing
discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 205
Because both plaintiffs previously identified themselves at educational
seminars and conferences as IV-positive, and one plaintiff disclosed her
HIV-positive status in an educational videotape that she acknowledged
would be used in a variety of educational settings, the court determined
that reasonable government officials could disagree on whether the
plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily waived their right not to have their
HIV-positive status disclosed to educators involved in HIV prevention.2"
From this, the court concluded the department was entitled to qualified
governmental immunity for publishing the plaintiff's names and their HIV-
positive status in the educational manual.217 Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106
(2nd Cir. 1997).
207d.
202Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106, 109 (2nd Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). The
plaintiffs also included a pendent state law claim under New York Public Hearth Law § 2782,
which generally prchibits the disclosure of an individual's HIV-related information except upon
written consent of the individual.
mId.
2NId.
2 sId. (citing Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995)) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
oId. at 110-11.
'rDoe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 1997).
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University Professor Not Entitled to Absolute
Immunity When Treating Private Patient
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the decision of the state
claims commission. The court determined that a physician acted beyond
the scope of his employment, as an associate professor at the state
university school of medicine, because the physician practiced medicine on
behalf of a private employer when treating a patient.O3
As a board certified emergency physician, the defendant physician was
employed by both the state university school of medicine and a private
medical group comprised of university faculty.20 The physician treated a
patient for an acute exacerbation of asthma.21 After the patient died from
this condition, her husband filed two simultaneous medical malpractice
suits, alleging first that the physician was an employee of the private
medical group, and second that he was acting as a state employee" The
state claims commission determined the physician was working within the
scope of his employrnt with the private practice group and not as a state
employee. Therefore, the physician was not entitled to absolute
immunity from liability.213 The physician appealed. 14
The court of appeals reasoned that the physician was engaged in dual
employment in which the university paid the physician for administrative,
teaching, and research responsibilities while the private medical group paid
the physician for direct patient care. 15 The court noted that since the
private medical group paid the physician to treat the patient, the physician
was acting beyond his scope of employment at the university and was not
Hayden v. Waler, No. 02A01-9511-BC-00241, 1996 WL740820 (Tenn. CL App. Dec.
30, 1996).
2JId. at *1-2.
21 Id. at *3.211 d.
212Id.
k-Iayen v. Waler, No. 02A01-9511-BC-00241, 1996 WL 740820, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 1996).
214 Id.
"td. at *5.
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entitled to immunity.216 Hayden v. Waller, No. 02AO1-9511-BC-00241,
1996 WL 740820 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30,1996).
LONG-TERM CARE
Home for Developmentally Disabled has Duty to
Protect from Reasonable Dangers, Including
Sexual Assault by Staff
The Supreme Court of Washington ruled a group home for
developmentally disabled persons had a duty to protect its residents from
foreseeable consequences of their impairments including sexual assault by
an employee.217 Although there was no duty to prevent a third party from
intentionally injuring another, the court ruled the nature of the residential
care created a "special relationship," thereby making the home responsible
for the protection of its residents from foreseeable third party conduct.1 '
The plaintiff was afflicted with cerebral palsy and had been a resident
of the defendant group home, a licensed provider of residential care for
persons suffering from developmental disabilities, since 1986.21 On
several occasions, the resident was sexually assaulted by an employee of
the home.22 At the time of the assaults, the employee was the only staff
member on duty violating a rule which prohibited male employees to be
alone with female residents."1 Following the assaults, the resident brought
an action against the home and employee on several tort theories including:
(1) breach of duty to protect from reasonable harms;
(2) negligent supervision of the employee; and
(3) the home's vicarious liability for the actions of its employee. 2
2161d. at *8.
217Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420 (Wash. 1997).2181d. at 427.
2191d. at 423.
=Id.
21Id. at 423.2
'Niece v. Elinview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420,423 (Wash. 1997).
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The trial court dismissed all of the resident's claims.Z On appeal, the
court held the home had a duty to protect its residents from foreseeable
harms including sexual assaults by staff members.24
The Supreme Court noted although there was no duty to prevent a
third party from intentionally injuring another person, such a duty was
created when a "special relationship" existed between the defendant and
third party. The court stated that here, as with a hospital-patient
relationship, the home had a special relationship with its residents,
especially since those residents were totally unable to protect themselves
and were therefore, completely dependent on the home and its care givers
for personal safety. 6 Although the home argued this duty extended only
to foreseeable harm, i.e. abuse by third parties or visitors, the court
explained that patients in group homes were, in fact, most susceptible to
injury by staff members.' Since staff members have less restricted access
to the patients, the potential for abuse is even greater than from a third
party or visitor. ' The court reasoned that because residents were least
able to protect themselves from abuse at the hands of group home staff,
even the most narrow reading of foreseeability would include protection
from such internal abuse. " 9
The court defined "foreseeable" to include all injuries within the
general field of danger which should have been anticipatedi)3 Further,
intentional or criminal behavior may be foreseeable unless it is so
extraordinary or improbable as to be beyond the range of expectability2 1
Since the employee had no prior offenses and came to the home with
positive references from a previous employer, the court stated although
there was a duty to protect against foreseeable danger, a jury must decide
whether the sexual assault by the employee himself was a foreseeable
risk.23-  Although the court ruled sexual assault was not totally
'Id.
"Id.
=Id.
mId. at 425.
mNiece v. Elnview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420,425 (WVashL 1997).
mid.
mid.
mId. at 426.
21Id. at 426.
rMiece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420,426 (Wash. 1997).
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unforeseeable, the issue was remanded for a jury to decide whether such
an assault was foreseeable in this particular case. 33
Nevertheless, the court refused to rule in favor of the resident based on
a theory of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability imposes liability on a
employer for the torts of its employees while acting on the employer's
behalf. However, the court stated that vicarious liability does not extend
to instances, such as the present case, in which the employee stepped aside
from the his/her responsibilities at work and pursued a personal objective.
Here, the staff member was clearly not acting in accordance with any
authorized policy, and was in fact acting in furtherance of his own personal
desires. Admittedly, even when an employee has strayed from the bounds
of employment, there is still a limited level of liability to which the group
home is indeed subjected to through vicarious liability. The court was
unwilling to extend such a liability to the group home, and ruled such a
matter would be better decided through legislation in accordance with
public policy. Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420 (Wash.
1997).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Lack of Clarity Not Fatal in Jury Instructions Failing to
State that a Nationwide Standard of Care Could be
Applied to Establish a Local Standard of Care
The Supreme Court of Delaware upheld a jury verdict in favor of a
cardiologist charged with negligence by a patient who received a cardiac
catheterization which resulted in the patient having to undergo heart
surgery.'" The court reached its decision even though jury instructions
lacked clarity in telling the jury they could apply a national standard of care
when the national standard was also found to be the local standard."
"
3Id.
'McKenzie v. Blasetto, 686 A.2d 160 (Del. 1996).
'Id. at 163. See Health Care Malpractice Insurance and Litigation Act, 13 Del. C. § 6804,
which states: "The standard of skill and care required of every health care provider in rendering
professional services or health care to a patient shall be that degree of skill ard care ordinarily
employed ... bymembers of the profession in good standing in the same commurtity or locality..."
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A family physician referred the patient to the cardiologist after the
patient began experiencing chest pain . 6 Tests indicated there may have
been coronary disease present, so the cardiologist recommended cardiac
catheterization. 7 During the catheterization, the cardiologist tore the
patient's right artery and the patient underwent emergency surgery to save
her life.W The patient and her husband filed a suit alleging malpractice on
the part of the cardiologist in the decision to catheterize and in the
performance of the catheterization? 9 The first trial resulted in a hung jury
and in the second trial, the jury found in favor of the physician."
The issue presented to this court was whether the trial court's failure
to give a national standard of care jury instruction violated the parties'
agreement to "dispense with any trial testimony [on the] local standards
issue" to save time in bridging the national standard of care with the local
standard of care. Although the agreement was never put on the record, the
court reviewed the jury instructions and the agreement between the parties
to determine whether the instructions violated the agreement.24' The court
found the agreement applied only to testimony given, not to the standard
of care actually applied and given in the instructions."4 The jury was
informed in the instructions they could apply a national standard of care if
that standard was also the local standard. 23 The court held that although
the instructions were not perfect, as long as they were not misleading and
stated the applicable law, they were permissible.2"4 McKenzie v. Blasetto,
686 A.2d 160 (Del. Supr. 1996).
7 Id. at 161.
n'Id.
mId.
23 McKernzie v. Blasetto, 686 A.2d 160, 161 (Del. 1996). The plaintiffs included Delaware
Heart Group, P.A., the professional organization Dr. Blasetto belonged to in the suit. Id.
24Id. at 162.24 1d. at 163.
21d.
2 1d.
2
"AlKenzie v. Blasetto, 686 A.2d 160 (Del. 1996). Sce also Haas v. United Teehnologics
Corp, 450 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Del. Sup. 1982).
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MEDICARE/MEDICAID
Showing of Irreparable Harm to Residents Justifies
Continued Medicare Funding of Nursing Home
Pending Outcome of Administrative Hearing
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted in
part and denied in part a motion brought by a long term skilled nursing
facility (nursing home) to prevent the Health Care Financing
Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
from terminating its Medicare funding.245 The court ordered the
continuation of Medicare funds pending the outcome of an administrative
hearing to determine whether the nursing home committed Medicare
violations. The court denied both the nursing home's motion for a
temporary restraining order and the Administration's motion to dismiss.' 6
The state department of health services (Department) inspected the
nursing home and found substantial deficiencies in its compliance with
Medicare regulations. Consequently, the Department informed the nursing
home its Medicare funding would be terminated. Two days before
termination of funding, the nursing home filed a "plan for correction," and
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the funding
termination on the following day. 47 The Department made a second
inspection, and although some progress had been made since the first visit,
the Department still found a lack of compliance. Thereafter, HHS
informed the nursing home its Medicare funding would be terminated, the
previously imposed civil penalties would continue, and payment for new
admissions would be denied.' The home responded by filing a motion for
emergency injunctive relief, alleging it was now in full compliance and
therefore should not have its Medicare funding terminated. An
administrative hearing was scheduled.249
u5Intemational Long Tenn Care v. Shalala, 947 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1996).
2Id. at 21.
2'ld. at 16.
24Id.249Id
"
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In order to succeed in its injunctive relief motion, the nursing home
was required to show a substantial "likelihood" of success on the merits,
and that "irreparable harn' would result if injunctive relief was not
granted. The court also had to consider any harm to the HHS or other
interested parties, and whether the injunction would be adverse to public
interest." The court measured these elements on a "continuum."2'
Because the nursing home presented a sufficiently substantial case to
prevail on the merits and a "clear showing" of irreparable harm existed to
the nursing hone's residents if Medicare funding ceased, the court ordered
the continuation Medicare funding.2- The court believed the irreparable
harm to residents alone was enough to grant preliminary injunctive relief.
However, the court was careful to note the continuation of funds would
only continue until the administrative hearing's determination, scheduled
only a few weeks following this opinion.2' The court concluded by
rejecting all the arguments raised against preliminary injunctive relief,
stating the extremely limited nature of this relief best served the
administrative process "given the unusual circumstances presented by this
case."2 International Long-Term Care, Inc. v. Shalala, 947 F. Supp. 15
(D.D.C. 1996).
Physician-Patient Privilege Does Not Provide Basis
for in Camera Review of Patient Files Seized in
Medical Fraud Prosecution
The Court of Appeal of California, Second District, Division Three, denied
a physician's motion for an in camera review of patients' records arising
out of state charges against the physician for state Medicaid insurance
fraud?"5 The physician allegedly engaged in criminal activity by preparing
false patient histories and creating "ghost patients" in violation of various
"International Long Term Care v. Shalala, 947 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1996).
51Id.
21d. at 19.
25 Id. at 19-20.
257d. at 21.
'sBrillantes v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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state statutes.' Investigators from the state bureau for medical insurance
fraud (Bureau) executed a valid search warrant on the physician's
residence and medical office, and seized patient records and billing
information which revealed sufficient information to charge the
physician.' The physician filed an objection to the search arnd seizure and
filed a motion to seal the records, stating he had a right to an in camera
review of the patient files in determining the "applicability of the patient-
physician privilege." '  The lower court denied the physician's objection,
yet sealed the files for thirty days allowing time for the physician to appeal.
The appellate court first examined the physician's complaint and cited
authority for the claim that the physician was entitled to in camera review.
The court held the cited opinion did not require the trial court to provide
an in camera review to the physician." The cited opinion involved a
breach of the attorney-client privilege, and did not provide a sweeping
right to a statutory hearing in all cases. The opinion merely held a court has
"the inherent power to protect a privilege-holder from improper disclosure
of confidential information."2 ' Moreover, the court stated, unlike the
attorney-client privilege, the physician in this case asserted privilege for his
own protection, not the protection of his patients. Further, the court found
that state Medicaid patients were aware certain informatfon would be
communicated to the state for the purpose of payment and would remain
available to the state for audits conducted during the course of Medicaid
fraud investigations.26' Additionally, the court agreed with the state's
assertion that the state had an interest in the welfare of its citizens and
concern for the public at large. The court found this interest further
justified a requirement of record inspection by a "responsible state agency"
to prevent insurance fraud.262 Finally, the court rejected the physician's
constitutional objections because the search warrant delineated specific
files to be taken and therefore protected patients' privacy interests, and no
5Id. at 773. The statutory violations were as follows: Welfare & Institutions Code §14107
(Submission of False Claims); Welfare and Institutions Code § 14107.2 (Kickbacks) and Penal
Code § 487.1 (Grand Theft).
Id.
Z ld.
25People v. Superior Court (Bauman & Rose), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
2
'01d. at 777.
2611d. at 779.
262 d.
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less intrusive alternative could be used to minimize the invasion on the
patients' privacy rights. Thus, the court concluded the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it rejected the physician's motion for an in
camera revimw. Brilantes v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 4th 323, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
MENTAL HEALTH
State Regulations Permitting Human Subject Research of
Mental Health Patients Held Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department,
afflrmed the lower court's decision to hold the state office of mental health
(Office) did not have proper authority to establish regulations pertaining
to human subject research, and the challenged research regulations were
unconstitutional.'
The Office established regulations pertaining to the use of human
subjects in "more than minimal risk" experiments on adults and minors who
were incapable of consenting to the procedures and resided at or were
treated in the Office's mental health facilities.265 The regulations governing
the research procedures provided for the administration of approved and
experimental antipsychotic and psychotropic drugs.?c  Further, the
regulations set forth the procedures for screening potential subjects and
ensuring the experiments would not conflict with the patient's treatment."z 7
A challenge to the Office's human subject research regulations was
brought by patients who were involuntarily hospitalized in the Office's
psychiatric facilities.
The patients first contended the Office lacked the authority to
promulgate the regulations because such authority was exclusively given
to the state commissioner of the department of health (Commissioner).
2Id.. at 783-84.
IT.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
mId. at 175.
2 d. at 176.
'20d.
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The court examined the text and legislative history of the relevant state
public health law, and concluded the state legislature intended to divide the
authority over medical research between the Office and Commissioner.2' 6
The Office had the authority to encourage and promote research in
furtherance of the its goal of preventing, diagnosing, and treating mental
illness.269 By contrast, the Commissioner had the duty to oversee all
human subject research and to protect the rights of those who may be
subject to such research.' As a result, any regulations governing human
subject research enacted solely by the Office were invalid."7
In response, the Office argued because its reguladons were in
compliance with federal regulations, the state public health law did not
apply. 2 However, the court found that because the Office failed to
comply with all applicable federal regulations, the state public health law
did indeed apply. Thus, the Office was required to get consent from the
Comnissioner regarding human subject research regulations using minors,
incompetents, or the the mentally disabled. The Office's failure to do so
was a violation of state law. 3
Finally, even though the Office's regulations were invalid, the court
examined the patients' constitutional claims in anticipaeton of future
controversy. Because the Office's experiments involved highly invasive
and painful procedures, and because the procedural guidelines set forth,
particularly those regarding patient consent, were inadequate, the court
held the regulations violated the patients' due process rights. 4 T.D. v.
New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996).
'Id. at 180.
IL.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 180 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).27OJd
"2
"Id. at 182.
nid. at 183.
mid.
217.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 183 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
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NEGLIGENCE
Exposure to HIV is Necessary to Maintain Claim for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a lower court's denial of
summary judgment, holding actual exposure to human immune deficiency
virus (HIV) was necessary to maintain a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.' The court further found that a hospital's policy of
non-segregated room assignments did not constitute outrageous conduct
because it was in accordance with current health standards. 76
The plaintiff entered an alcohol and drug rehabilitation center and,
without his knowledge or consent, was assigned to a room with a patient
carrying the HIV virus.2" As roommates for eight days, the two men
shared a bathroom and toilet. After accidentally using his roommate's
razor, the roommate told the plaintiff he was infected with HIV. 79 The
plaintiff left the hospital before completion of the program and complained
that the hospital's policy of placing HWI-infected and non-infected patients
in the same room constituted outrageous conduct.2" He claimed that he
had suffered emotional distress in fearing contraction of the AIDS virus."'
The court held the hospital's housing policy was not outrageous
conduct because the hospital had complied with all applicable health care
standards. Nor did the hospital's actions fall into one of the limited
circumstances where patient segregation was recommended by the
American Hospital Association.' Further, the court found the plaintiffs
claim of emotional distress was without merit because he neglected to
establish a reasonable connection between the act of the hospital and the
injury alleged.m The court stated public policy imposed no legal duty to
25Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tenn. 1997).2 61d.
2nId.
=aId.
wId.
mBain v. Wels, 936 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tenn. 1997).
231d.
=Id.
2
mId. at 625-26.
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protect against the fear of contracting AIDS in the absence of actual
exposure to HIV.' To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would
encourage public misconceptions about AIDS and the transferal of the HIV
virus. 5 Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tenn. 1997).
Physician Barred From Bringing Negligence CJ'aim
Against Silicon Breast Manufacturer
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second
Department, reversed a lower court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss
submitted by the manufacturer of silicone breast implants and silicone gel
in a case brought by a physician against the manufacturer for allegedly
causing injury to the physician. The court held the physician could not
maintain a negligence cause of action against the manufacturer for damages
the physician suffered as a result of negative publicity concerning the
implants; because the manufacturer failed to disclose risks to the physician,
and because the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applied and barred
such a claim 6
The physician was a reconstructive and plastic surgeon who devoted
a large portion of his practice to cosmetic breast surgery. 7 Prior to 1992,
the physician regularly used silicone implants purchased from the defendant
manufacturer. However, in 1992 the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) announced silicone breast implants were unsafe and called for a
moratorium on their use.' Following the announcement, many of the
physician's patients filed lawsuits against him2 In turn, the physician filed
a suit against the manufacturer alleging the negative publicity and failure
to disclose risks associated with the implants resulted in economic harm
'Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tenn. 1997).
2Id. at 625.
2Vitolo v. Dow Coming Corp., 651 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1996).
2"Id.
wId.
2Id.
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and a loss of income to the physician.' The manufacturer moved to
dismiss the claim. 291
The court determined the claim depended upon the classification of
the underlying transaction because physician sought to recover economic
damages rather than damages suffered due to an injury to person or
property. If the transaction was classified as a sale of goods, Article 2
of the UCC would be invoked.293 Such a classification would limit the
physician's recovery to contractual remedies and preclude a cause of action
for negligence and strict products liability.2' By contrast, a classification
of the transaction as predominately service oriented would exempt the
claim from UCC coverage and prevent the physician from recovering under
theories of breach of implied or express warranty.295
Upon examining the transaction, the court held the transaction was
properly defined as a sale of goods under the UCC.2-6 The court
acknowledged that the manufacturer serviced the physician's account by
inspecting defective implants and by supplying medical and product
information to the plaintiff.297 However, because such actions were
incidental to the sale of the implants, the transaction constituted a sale of
goods and the UCC applied.es Therefore, the physician could not maintain
a cause of action against the manufacturer for negligence and his claim was
properly dismissed 299 Vitolo v. Dow Corning Corp., 651 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1996).
Id.291Vitolo v. Dow Coming Corp., 651 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (1996).
=Id.
WId.
2'sId.
'Vitolo v. Dow Coming Corp., 651 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (1996).
2nId.
Id.
'-wId.
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Surgeon Need Not Be Present During the
Administration of Anesthesia
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court's holding that
a surgeon need not be present during the administration of anesthesia
provided the surgeon was present in the operating suite. The court ruled
that under the circumstances the surgeon could not be held liable under the
theories of "borrowed servant" or "captain of the ship." 3'
The plaintiff patient underwent hernia surgery under anethesia
administered by a certified registered nurse anethesiologist (CRNA) when
the regular anesthesiologist was not present.'O° Under state law, the
surgeon was not required to take part in the process.3" In this case, the
surgeon was paged and took the call in the operating suite as the anesthesia
process was being completed. 3 When the surgeon returned, he noticed
that the patient had experienced an adverse reaction to the anesthesia and
had suffered brain damage as a result.3 4
The court held the surgeon was not negligent in being absent from the
operating room during the administration of anesthesia.305 It found that the
CRNA could administer anesthesia without a surgeon or anesthesiologist
present, and it was fairly common practice in hospitals to do so." The
court also refused to hold the surgeon liable under the borrowed servant
rule, which provides that a servant who is temporarily loaned to another
person to do his employer's work becomes a servant of the. person who
borrowed that individual's services.07 The court found the surgeon had
no right of control over the actions of CRNA, and the CRNA was,
therefore, not his borrowed servant.-0 8 Similarly, the court found the
surgeon was not liable under the "captain of the ship" doctrine which states
'Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So. 2d 737 (Miss. 1997).
301Id. at 738-39.
"Id. at 740.
mId. at 739.
3NId
'Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So. 2d 737, 740 (Miss. 1997).
301d.
17d. at 741.
'Starcher v. Byme, 687 So. 2d 737, 741 (Miss. 1997).
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a surgeon has the ultimate responsibility for the care of the patient.3 The
court held the CRNA had ultimate responsibility under the circumstances
of this case.31 Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So. 2d 737 (Miss. 1997).
PtYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUiCIE
No Constitutional Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held
no constitutional right exists for physician assisted suicide and a state
statute prohibiting physician assisted suicide did not violate the due process
clause or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution?"
In this action, a physician and his patient sought a court order to
prohibit the county attorney from prosecuting them under the state statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide." 2 A lower court granted a
permanent injunction against the county attorney.1 3 However, while this
order was on appeal, the state enacted a statute which created a new crime
of "criminal assistance of suicide."314 Two circuit court judges declared the
criminal provisions of the new statute unconstitutional, and appeals were
subsequently filed. The state supreme court held assisted suicide was a
crime at common law.31 In response to this decision, the judge which had
originally entered an injunction prohibiting prosecution of the physician and
patient entered a new order of permanent injunction against the physician,
enjoining him from participating in the act of assisted suicide."' The
appellate court affirnmd the lower court's permanent injunction, and the
case was taken up on a petition for certiorari by the federal district court.1"
"Id. at 742.31Old.
3
.Kervorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich. 1997).3121d. at 1154.
3t3Id.
314 d. (citing MICH. COMP. Lams § 750.505 (1993)).
315 1d. at 1167.
316Kervorlian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1167 (E.D. Mich. 1997).317Id.
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First, the federal district court found the physician had standing to contest
the permanent injunction on two grounds: (1) the physician satisfied the
"injury" requirement because he faced enjoinment of activities (assisted
suicide) which would create a "real and immediate" injury or threat of
injury;318 and (2) a physician may derivatively assert the constitutional
rights of his terminally ill patients.319
Next, the court addressed whether it should abstain from adjudicating
this case due to the Younger doctrine.32 In Younger, the Supreme Court
held that federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal
proceedings except in the very unusual circumstance where an injunction
is necessary to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable hijury.32 The
court applied a three prong test and determined:
(1) there was a pending state proceeding;
(2) the plaintiff had adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims
in the state proceeding; and
(3) there were not sufficient extraordinary circumstances which
warranted federal intervention.3z
Thus, the court abstained from adjudicating the physician's requested
injunction against the county prosecutor. However, the. court also
analyzed the patient's request for declaratory judgment. The court
reasoned since there was no pending state proceeding against the patient,
the Younger doctrine did not apply. 3
Next, the court held the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits
a federal court from hearing a case already litigated in state court, did not
apply to the patient's case.3' The court indicated the patient was never a
party in any of the state court actions involving her physician and his
31 id. at 1159 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,493 (1974)).
31 1d. at 1160 (citing Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996)).
3
"Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
nKervcrldan v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1161 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (citing Younger at
44-46).
3=Id.
mid.
324Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 412 (1923). This doctrine stands for the
proposition that a federal district court may not hear what is effectively an appeal of a case
already litigated in state court.
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challenges of the state assisted suicide laws, thus the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine could not be used to defeat her claim in federal court.- s
Finally, the court addressed the merits of the patient's constitutional
claims. First, the court held no cognizable right to assisted suicide
exists. The court reasoned the right to assisted suicide was not "deeply
rooted in the Nation's history or traditions," or without support in the text
of the Constitution.' z The court also found that suicide was traditionally
a criminal offense' and thirty-two jurisdictions had statutes which
crinminalized assisted suicide.329 The court rejected the patient's claim that
assisted suicide was a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 Given the historical treatment of
assisted suicide, the court did not want to create or find a new
constitutional right "where none existed before."'33' Rather, the court
determined assisted suicide was an issue of policy which should be decided
by the policy branches of government, and not the courts.3
The court also held the plaintiff's equal protection claim was without
merit 33 The patient contended that persons seeking physician assistance
with suicide are denied equal protection under the laws when the law
protects the right to reject medical treatment for those on life support, but
prohibits assisted suicide for those not on life.3-  The court stated that the
two situations were distinguishable in that suicide involved an affirmative
act to end life, whereas the refusal or cessation of life support simply
allowed life to run its course.'35 The court held there was no equal
protection violation since "the Constitution does not require things which
32Kervorkian, 947 F. Supp. at 1166.
'Kervorkdan v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
rId. at 1167 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937)).
MMd.
nId.
30Id. at 1168-1170.
33Kervorldan v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1169 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
- Id. at 1171.
33ld. at 1172-1173.
'Id. at 1172. See generally, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,296
(1990). Plaintiffs rely on Justice Scalia's concurrence in Cruzan for the proposition that there
is no meaningful difference between the withdrawal of life support and an overt ct to terminate
life. However, the Cruzan majority rejected Justice Scalia's position.
mId.
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are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
sarm." I3 Kervorkian v. Thompson, 947F. Supp. 1152 (El). Mich. 1997).
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Waiver of Physician-Patient Privilege Leads to Estoppel
of Privilege Claim in Subsequent Action
The Supreme Court of Michigan held a motorist who had disclosed his
medical records in a previous action for negligence was estopped from
asserting the physician-patient privilege in a related case between the same
plaintiff and the motorist's physicians. 7 Because the motorist had waived
his physician-patient privilege in the prior case, he has was estopped from
"picking and choosing" among similarly situated parties where the
information sought was identical and requested for the same purpose in
both cases.3
Years earlier, the motorist suffered a seizure and thereby lost control
of his vehicle, striking the plaintiff and injuring the plaintiff severely and
permanently.339 Plaintiff settled out of court with the motorist's insurance
company, however, he commenced a second suit with the motorist's
hospital and physician.m Plaintiff claimed the hospital and physician were
liable for his injuries due to their failure to diagnose and properly treat the
motorist's epilepsy. 1 During the original suit, the motorist waived his
physician-patient privilege, giving the plaintiff access to all of his medical
records concerning the case and his epilepsy." However, in the failure to
diagnose suit, the defendant hospital and physician refused to disclose the
motorist's medical records to plaintiff and asserted the physician-patient
336Kervorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1173 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (citing Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)).
33Landelius v. Sackellares, 556 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. 1996).
338d. at 477.
3391d. at 473.
4Id.
1d.
I4Landelius v. Sackellares, 556 N.W.2d 472, 473 (S.C. Mich. 1996).
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privilege on their own behalf." Because plaintiff was unable to present a
primafacie case against the second set of defendants without the medical
records as evidence, he subsequently sued the motorist a second time,
alleging breach of the original settlement agreement.' Both the trial court
and the appellate court found nothing in the original release agreement
which required the motorist to disclose the medical records in the separate
action against the hospital and physician."
On review, the supreme court stated the physician-patient privilege
was not designed to shield information from plaintiffs who previously had
access to the very same inforrnation.' Rather, the privilege was intended
to prevent embarrassment and to encourage the free disclosure and
confidential communication between physicians and their patients." The
court cited Hamilton v. Verdow, where a defendant was estopped from
asserting the physician-patient privilege in a case against him for murder
where he had previously waived that same privilege in an unrelated case for
a different murder. 8 In the present case, the court determined the plaintiff
was entitled to the information because the records pertained to one
underlying event and the very same plaintiff in both the original motorist
action and the action against the hospital and physician. 9 Therefore, the
court refused to allow the motorist to choose one cause of action over
another and reassert his physician-patient privilege against the same
plaintiff in a suit arising from the same circumstances. - In closing, the
court examined the original waiver form, which authorized the release of
information to be used "in a pending lawsuit."'  Since specific parties
were not mentioned in the waiver, the court read the document to be a
general waiver applicable to all suits arising from the same underlying
event.352 Landelius v. Sackellares, 556 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. 1996).
'Id. at 473474.
3Id. at 474.
3Id.
4'1Id. at 475.
'Landelius v. Sackellares, 556 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Mich. 1996).
3id. at 475-76 (citing Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544,414 A.2d 914 (1980)).
3Id. at 476 (Mich. 1996).35d.
3 11d. at 477.
-Landelius v. Sackellares, 556 N.W.2d 472,477 (Mich. 1996).
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PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Relationship Not Created by Mailing X-ray Report to Insured
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled a physician did not initiate a
physician-patient relationship by sending an x-ray report to an insured
individual in accordance with the insurance carrier's policy. Therefore, the
physician did not subject herself to medical malpractice liability with the
insured individual?53 The court ruled no relationship between the
physician and plaintiff was created because the report merely notified the
insured individual as to the existence of the report, as opposed to advising
the individual about the content of the report.3" Thus, no physician
function was performed for the individual and the insured individual could
not recover for medical malpractice. 55
The plaintiff underwent chest x-rays after complaining of a persistent
cough and fear of suffering from pneumonia.3 The x-rays and subsequent
CAT scan revealed the existence of a malignant granuloma tumor and
therefore, the patient underwent surgery for its removal.357 Previously, and
prior to the tumor discovering x-ray, the plaintiff received numerous x-rays
in order to fulfill the requirements of her life insurance carri-r.358 One set
of x-rays was ordered and performed by one of the insurance carrier's
contracted physicians, but interpreted by the defendant physician, who had
contracted individually with the insurance physician. 359  The report
submitted to the insurance company and plaintiff contained defendant's
observations of a small lesion, which she believed to be a benign
granuloma, but did not contain any advice or recommendations for follow
up visits." Although the plaintiff stipulated a physician-patient
3
'Promubol v. Hackett, 686 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).3 1d. at 419.
3
"Id.
3
"'Id. at 417-18.3 71d. at 418.
3
'Promubol v. Hackett, 686 A.2d 417, 418 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).359Id. The x-ray performing physician was under a contract for such services directly with
the insurance company. Although defendant was not under a contract ftc~m the insurance
company herself, she did have a contract with the insurance contracted physician to interpret the
x-rays and issue reports on her own observations.
36Id. at 418.
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relationship was not created where a physician examines a patient at the
behest of an insurance company, she claimed the relationship was created
when defendant directly sent her a copy of the x-ray report. 361 The plaintiff
claimed the mailing of the report constituted the rendering of negligent
advice because the defendant physician failed to diagnose the apparent
lesion as malignant and therefore, defendant was open to negligence
liability.3
62
The court recognized a long line of precedent which clearly stated a
patient may not succeed on a negligence action against a physician where
a third party has sponsored or ordered the examination of that patient.3
Because there was no relationship created in those cases, there was no
duty owed to the patient by the physician in question. Therefore, no
breach regardless of negligence. - In the present case, the court stated the
plaintiff did not employ the defendant, nor did she seek defendant's advice
or receive defendant's treatment.36 Therefore, based on this lack of
contact, no physician-patient relationship had been created and defendant
owed no duty of care to the plaintiff whatsoever.3"
The court next addressed and clarified the difference between advice
and notification, stating the x-ray report was clearly not advice because it
did not contain any, "opinion expressed as to wisdom of future
conduct."3 ' The x-ray report was simply mailed in accordance with the
insurance carrier's policy that the insured be notified of the information
being submitted to the insurance company itself." Therefore, because the
report was a simple notification and did not constitute advice or
recommendations in any sense, no physician-patient relationship was
created and, thus, the defendant physician was not liable for the failure to
diagnose the plaintiff's malignant tumor. 9 Promubol v. Hackett, 686 A2d
417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
311d. at 419.
-sPromubol v. Hackett, 686 A.2d 417,420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).Jd.
"Id. at 421.
3id.
3id. at 420 (citing BLACKS LaW DIcTONARY 74 (4th Ed. 196S)).
'Prornubol v. Hackett, 686 A.2d 417,421 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
39d.
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Medical Device Found "Unreasonably Dangerous
Per Se" Not Preempted by Medical Device
Amendments of 1976
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a metal bone
implant which aggravated and compounded a plaintiffs back injuries was
"unreasonably dangerous per se" and not preempted by the Medical Device
Amendments (MDA) of 1976. The court further ruled the damage
award from the trial was reasonable; however, the inventor of the device
could not be held liable under a theory of products liability, because he was
considered neither a manufacturer nor a supplier.37'
The plaintiff seriously injured her back, was diagnosed with spinal
stenosis, and subsequently underwent surgery to alleviate this condition. 7 2
The procedure used to correct the condition involved bone grafting from
plaintiff's hip and fusing the grafts with metal bone plates and screws
manufactured by the defendantY.37  Six months after the surgery, plaintiff
began to complain about back pains not present prior to the surgery and
alleged the pains were caused by defective plate and screw devices. 374 The
trial court determined the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the failure to warn cause of
action.' Although this preemption also prevented plaintiff fi'om asserting
her claims for defective design and manufacturing, the jury concluded that
defendant's devices did cause plaintiff's pains and were "unreasonably
dangerous per se."'376 Therefore, the jury awarded a judgment to plaintiff
for $318,000 in damages.377
3mReeves v. Acromed, 103 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1997).
71Id. at 444.
3Md.
mnld.
374Id.
375Reeves v. Acromed, 103 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Medical Device
Amendments to the Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301).
376Id
rId.
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On appeal, the defendant manufacturer claimed MDA also preempted
the "unreasonably dangerous per se" cause of action and therefore, the
$318,000 judgment was inappropriate.38' The metal bone plate device had
been FDA approved through the 510(k) "substantial equivalency" process,
an exception to the rigorous Pre-Market Approval (PMA) process required
for all new post-1976 devices. 9 Although the device qualified for 510(k)
approval, the court stated the 510(k) process merely assured "substantial
equivalence" and did not concern itself with safety.3" Therefore, even
though defendant's metal bone plate had been approved by FDA, this
approval did not preempt liability based on safety, because a "substantially
equivalent" device was never formally reviewed under the MDA for safety
and efficacy.3 ' The defendant was allowed to bypass the rigorous
requirements of formal PMA approval; consequently, the defendant
subjected itself to liability based on negligent manufacture and design."
The defendant's device could not escape claims for negligent
manufacturing and design simply by being "substantially similar" to a pre-
1976 device. 83 Further, because a 510(k) approval did not require the
defendant to produce the device in any particular form, defendant remained
liable for "unreasonably dangerous per se" claims and strict liability
defective design claims. 84
mId. at 444-445.
"Id. at 445. Before a new medical device can be marketed to the public, it must receive
approval from the FDA through the Pre-Market approval process. This process is expensive and
very time consuming, requiring multiple research and safety studies before approval will be
given. However, there are two exceptions to this rigorous process. Frst, all pre-1976 device,
cone under a "grandfather clause." Those pre-1976 devices did not require PMA approval and
were therefore allowed to remain on the market until FDA initiated and required a PMA to be
performed. (21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)). Second, a post-1976 device may avoid the PMA
process by submitting a 510(k) application to FDA demonstrating the proposed device is
"substantially sim " to a pre-1976 "grandfather clause" device. (21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B)).
unReeves v. Acromed, 103 F.3d 442,446 (5th Cir. 1997).
311M.
-MId.
-MId.
3 Id. A 510(k) application simply states the manufacturer's device (predicate device) is
substantially equivalent to the pre-1976 device (parent device). Substantial equivalence merely
requires the predicate device to have the same intended use and same technological
characteristics of the parent device. Therefore, once "substantial equivalence" has been shown,
a 510(k) device manufacturer is not bound to the parent device's manufactured form or process.
Since manufacturing process' mayvary among 510(k) devices, the manufacturer is still liable for
negligent design and negligent manufacturing claims which are not preempted by the MDA.
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The court reversed the trial court's determination that plaintiff's
defective design and defective manufacturing claims were preempted by
MDA and upheld the judgment of $318,000 against the defendant on the
"unreasonably dangerous per se" charge.38
The court ruled plaintiff's claim against the inventor of the metal bone
plate could not be upheld. 6 Under basic theories of recovery for product
liability, the plaintiff must establish the defendant was the manufacturer or
supplier of the product in question.3" Because the inventor did not place
the device on the market or introduce it into the stream of commerce, he
could not be considered a manufacturer or supplier in an individual
capacity.3' Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1997).
Public Health
Municipal Health Board Cannot Promulgate Smoking
Regulations Encompassing Policies Specifically
Reserved for Other Municipality Bodies
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed summary judgment for
the County Board of Health (Board) in a declaratory judgment action filed
by county residents and taxpayers who challenged the enactrent of county
smoking control rules promulgated by the Board.389 Residents and
taxpayers alleged:
(1) the Board failed to follow the proper notice procedures for enacting
health regulations;
(2) the Board exceeded its statutory authority when it enacted the
smoking control rules;
3Reeves v. Acromed, 103 F.3d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1997).
3Id.
3Id.
3aId.
'City of Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 478 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
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(3) if the Board was granted statutory authority to enact Smoking
Control Rules, this was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
powers;
(4) residents and taxpayers in the plaintiff class lost business and profits
without due process of law as a result of the Board's actions; and
(5) the terms and provisions of the smoking control rules discriminated
between similarly situated businesses."
Both parties filed motions for summary judgnnt. The lower court
granted the Board's motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. 91
The appellate court held the Board's actions would fal within the
scope of its authority only if the health rules enacted:
(1) related to the promotion or protection of health;
(2) were reasonable in light of the health risk;
(3) did not violate any law or constitutional provision;
(4) did not discriminate; and
(5) did "not make distinctions based upon policy concerns traditionally
reserved for legislative bodies."392
Because the smoking control rules contained distinctions in its application
which should have been reserved for "legislative p olicy-making," the court
held the rules were invalid, and found it unnecessary to discuss any of the
remaining factors. 93
Assuming the Board was able to promulgate smoking regulations, the
court found the plaintiffs had demonstrated the Smoldng Control Rules in
this case were invalid because they exempted some business establishments
based on non-health related factors. The burden of proof, therefore,
9Id. at 531-32.
31 Id. at 532.
3id. at 533 (citing State v. Curtis, 52 S._.2d 364, 365 (N.C. 1949); Clars Charolette v.
Hunter, 134 S.E.2d 364, 369 (N.C. 1964); Cookie's Diner, Inc. v. Columbus Bd. of Health,
640 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ohio 1994); Weber v. Board of Health, 74 N.E.2d 331,336 (Ohio
1947); Borealis v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (N.Y. 1987); Matter of Council for Onaer
Occupied Housing v. Abrams, 511 N.Y.S.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
"uCity of Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 478 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Cookie's Diner, 640 N.E.2d at 1240-41).
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shifted to the Board to rebut this assertion.3" The court found the Board
had failed to provide a health-related explanation for why some
establishments fell under the Smoking Control Rules while others did not.
Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's grant of sum qary judgment
for the Board, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 95 City of
Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 478 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
Reproductive Issues
State Statute Regulating Abortions After Twenty
Weeks Gestation Places an Undue Burden
on a Woman's Right to Choose
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a state statute396 restricting
abortions after twenty weeks gestational age placed an undue burden on
a woman's right to choose whether to abort a nonviable fetus and
therefore, violated the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. 97
The issue presented to the court on remand was whether the state's
attempt to regulate abortions after twenty weeks gestational age was
constitutional. 39  The court adopted the "undue burden" test, first
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey" to reach its decision." ° In Casey, the Supreme Court held that
"[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore, a provision of law is invalid, if its
purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
3941d. at 535.
39Id.
3
'1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-7-302(3) (1995).
3
" -Jane L v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996).
'Id. at 1113. The United States Supreme Court limited its review to determine whether
two provisions of the Utah statute § 76-7-302(2) and § 76-7-302(3) were severable. The Court
ultimately held that the provisions were in fact severable. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 U.S. 2068
aff dper curiam. (1996).
39PIanned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'
1
"JaneL., 102 F.3d at 1114.
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seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."" ° Of consequence,
the Casey Court expressly rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review
applied in similar abortion cases decided since Roe v. Wade.4 2
Looking to the legislature's express purpose for passing the abortion
provisions, the court determined that the state made a deliberate decision
to disregard controlling Suprem Court precedent and to ignore the
Court's directive that viability is a matter for an attending physician to
decide.403 The court, therefore, declared the state abortion statute was
enacted with the specific purpose of placing an "insurmountable obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking the nontherapeutic abortion of a nonviable
fetus after twenty weeks." 4 Based on those facts, the court concluded the
state statute imposed both an unconstitutional burden on a woman's right
to choose to have an abortion and an impermissible impact upon those
women whose conduct the statute sought to effect.40 5 For those women
seeking an abortion, the court believed the statute "[i]mposed more than
a substantial obstacle; it constituted an outright ban.'" As such, the court
declared the statute unconstitutional 40 7 Jane L. v. Bangerter 102 F3d
1112 (10th Cir. 1996).
Settlement
A Tortfeasor Who Settles Cannot Recover in a Separate Lawsuit
From a Hospital Center Alleged to be a Joint Tortfeasor
When the Hospital Not Part of Original Suit
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held a tortfeasor who settles a
claim may not recover a contribution of the settlement from a hospital
4"Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).
'Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
' Iane L v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1996).
4OId.
4Id. at 1116.
'Id. at 1117.
47Id.
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center alleged to be a joint tortfeasor when the plaintiff had never sued the
center.4
The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her child, filed an action against
the District of Columbia (District) for injuries sustained when they were
struck by a motor vehicle which was involved in a high speed car chase
with a District police officer.4" The plaintiff was treated at the hospital
center for these injuries.410 Without regard to causation, the plaintiff
suffered severe and permanent injuries.4" The District settled with the
plaintiff for $300,000.412 Subsequently, the District brought an action
against the hospital center to recover a contribution for the sum it paid to
settle the lawsuit. The District alleged the hospital center's negligence
exacerbated and proximately caused the injuries to the plaintiff.413 The trial
court granted the hospital center's motion for judgment on the pleadings
and the appellate court afffirmed.414
The appellate court held that a settling tortfeasor is not entitled to
contribution from non-settling defendants, even when the latter are found
to be negligent.415 The court stated the policy behind settlements is to
allow the settling tortfeasor to "buy his peace" 6 for a specified sum. The
settling tortfeasor assumes the risk that it may pay a greater portion of the
plaintiff's damages than it would have paid after trial and verdict.417 The
court reasoned it would be unfair to disadvantage a defendant tortfeasor
with a settlement to which he was not a party and to which he did not
consent. 418 District of Columbia v. Washington Hospital Center, No. 94-
CV-319, 1996 WL 752952 (D.C. Dec. 31,1996).
"District of Columbia v. Washingtm Hosp. Center, 686 A,2d 1053 (D.C. App. 1996), 1996
WL 752952 (D.C. Dec. 31, 1996).
4'9Id. at *1.41Od.
41 id.
412ld
"41Distict of Columbia v. Washington Hosp. Cr., 686 A.2d 1053 (D.C. App. 1996).
4141d.
415Id. at *3.
4161d.
4171d.
4t8District of Columia v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 686 A.2d 1053, 1055 (1).C. App. 1996)
(citing Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 129, 131 (1962)).
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Statutes of Limitations
Occurrence-Based Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations Held Unconstitutional
The Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed the trial court's decision, holding
the statute of limitations contained in the state medical malpractice act was
unconstitutional 4 9 The court further held even if the statute of limitations
was constitutional, the limitations period should have tolled by the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment when a physician withheld important
information from the patient.420
The patient went to her physician after noticing a lump in her
breast.42' The physician was out of town so a nurse completed a
mammography which revealed a benign cyst.4' The patient scheduled a
biopsy with another physician, but her regular physician convinced her to
cancel the appointment and performed a needle aspiration instead.4
Although the physician assured the patient she had no basis for concern;
nearly three years later, an adenocarcinoma of the breast forced the
plaintiff to undergo chemotherapy.424 The plaintiff subsequently filed a
complaint against her former physician for negligence.4 s The trial court
ruled plaintiff's claim was time-barred under the statute of limitations, and
that her physician's actions did not amount to fraudulent concealment.426
The court of appeals first stated the state statute of limitations for
medical malpractice actions was unconstitutional because it was an
occurrence-based statute while other tort actions were covered by a
discovery-based statute 7 The statute for medical malpractice actions
began to run at the time of the occurrence of the alleged negligence, rather
than at the time the alleged negligence was discovered.4 Although the
Mlartin v. Richey, 674 N.E.2d 1015 (lnd. CL App. 1997).
A2Id.
4nId. at 1017.
4nId.
4
nId.
"Martin v. Richey, 674 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Id. CL App. 1997).
42Id.
C6.Id.
47Id. at 1019.
'Id.
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court recognized this difference was reasonably related to the goal of
decreasing medical malpractice litigation, the court reasoned those who
discover their medical negligence after the statute has run were treated
unequally, therefore, the statute was ruled unconstitutional.429
The court further held that even if the statute of limitations was
constitutional, the statute of limitations in this case should have tolled by
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.43 The court found the physician's
conduct prevented the patient from discovering the truth about her
condition, thereby preventing the discovery of his wrong."' The court
remanded the case to the trial court. Martin v. Richey, 674 N.E.2d 1015
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
4 Martin v. Richey, 674 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
4"Id. at 1019.
431Id. at 1018.
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